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arrogance? Or does tht
Congress?
.S. reaffirmed Mi randa an!d invalidluted
Shortly after Dickei
35017 a
numbher of Supreme Court watchers criticized the Court for its "juldicial
awog;ance9'in peremptorily rejecting Congress' test for the admissiIbility of
confe ssions. The test, pointed out the critics, had bcen adopted by Congress; after
1
extensive hearings and debate about Miranda's adverse impact on law
enforcement.
all.
The Dicker.son Court did rzolt discuss the legislativc his:tory of §
- - - -- However, in an article published six weeks before the decision in ClLnLk3ul
"Can (Did) Congress 'Overrule' Miranda?" 85 Cornell Law Review 8833 (
Professor Yale Kamisar discussed the legislative history of § 3501 at length
concluded, in eflect, that Congress - not the Supreme Court - should be
?. According to Kamisar, proponents of § 3501
awarded the prize for c
were detennined to "01
Miranda by simple legislation; they hoped to
bypass the prescribed process jor amending the Constitution and to persuade the
Courit to retrecz t from R4iranda. Extracts from the article appear here with
perm1ission of Cornell ILaw Review. (Experts representing the many sides of the
issue will gath er at the Law Schlool in November to ponder "Corqession La14
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As Professor Otis Stephens noted in "The
Supreme Court and Confessions of Guilt"
(1973),his book-length study of the
Suprcme Court and confessions: "In the
aftermath of Miranda v. A e o n a , an array of
Supreme Court critics, in and out of
Congress, insisted on linking the new
interrogation requirements with what they
described as an unparalleled national crisis
in crime control and law enforcement."In
riewspaper editorials, as well as in legslative
halls. Miranda was charged with wreaking
havoc and the Warren Court accused of
coddling criminals,' 'handcuffing police,'
:'nd otherwise undermining 'law and order'
at the very time when police faced their
mhst perilous and overwhelming
cllallenge."
<L L
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Section 3501 and other provisions of
Title I1 of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 were written and
debated against this general background. As
Fred Graham. then the Supreme Court
correspondent for the Netv York Times,
observed, "[wlhen Title I1 burst from the
relative obscurity of the Senate Judiciary
Committee onto the Senate floor in April of
1968 it was immediately seen as a bald
congressional attempt to rap the Supreme
Court's knuckles over crime. Its provisions
read like a cataloLgueof familiar pevances
against the Warren Court:
"First, it purported to reverse Miranda . .
. [in] federal trials. . . . Second, it included
the similar effort to overrule United States v
Wade, a 1967 case that established the right
to counsel at pretrial lineups. . . . These two
sections applied only to federal courts, but
it was assumed that state legislatures would
pass similar laws if these were to get by the

Supreme Court. Third, it overturned
Mallo~y.. . . Fourth, it abolished the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to review
state convictions in habeas corpw
proceedings. Fifth, it stripped away the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and all
other [federal] courts to overturn a state
court's finding that a confession was
voluntary or a . . . trial court3 holding that
an eye-witness identification was
admissible.
"Nothing quite so irregular had ever
been aimed at the Supreme Court by
Congress before. It was essentially an
attempt to use a statute to reverse a string of
Supreme Court decisions, most of which
had been interpretations of the
Constitution. . . . The supporters of Title I1
made little effort to disguise their intent to
blackjack the Court into c h a n p g its
course. In private, Senator McClellan called
it 'my petition for a rehearing' on Miranda
. . . . [As the Senate Judiciary Committee]
e-xplained,'the Miranda decision itself was
by a bare majority of one, and with
increasing frequency the Supreme Court
has reversed itself. The committee feels that
by the time the issue of constitutionality
would reach the Supreme Court, the
probability rather is that the legslation
would be upheld.'
"Those were the sentiments of a
committee that was dominated by Southern
senators who had been nursing hurt
feelings over the school desegregation
decision of 1954 and who wanted to take it
out on the Supreme Court o17er crime."
Graham characterized Title I1 as "a piece
of dubious statesmanship designed more to
chastise the Supreme Court than to
improve the law.'' Another close observer of
the debate over Title 11, Professor Robert
Burt, put it more strongly: "Title 11 was, to
an important degree, a gesture of defiance
at a Court that protected criminals and
Communists, and attacked traditional
religous, political, and social institutions.''

During the debates on Title 11, Senator
John McClellan told his colleagues that "the
tone is set at the top" and that "the
Supreme Court has set a low tone in law
enforcement." As already noted. Senator
McClellan chaired the Senate subcommittee
hearings on Title I1 and drafted some of the
Crime Bill provisions. He also managed the
Judiciary Committee's bill. Moreo\~er,
McClellan dominated both the subcommittee
hearings and the debates on the Senate
floor. One might say that as far as the
congressional battle over Title I1 was
concerned, Senator McClellan "set the tone
at the top," and he set it very low indeed.
The depth of his anger at the Court and the
intensity of his emotion-charged language is
evident in many of his statements, as the
following examples demonstrate:
[The] tone is set at the top. The Supreme
Court has set a low tone in law
enforcement, and we are reaping the
whirlwind today. Look at [the crime
graph] chart. Look at it and weep for
your country Crime spiraling upward
and upward and upward. Apparently
nobody is willing to put on the brakes. I
say to my colleagues today that the
Senate has the opportunity - and the
hour of decision is fast approaching. . . .
[If] this confessions provision is
defeated, the law-breaker will be the
beneficiary, and he will be further
encouraged and reassured that he can
continue a life of crime and depredations
profitably with impunity and without
punishment. . . . [If Title I1 is defeated]
every gangster and overlord of the
underworld; . . . every murderer, rapist,
robber . . . will have cause to rejoice and
celebrate.
Whereas, if it is defeated, the safety of
decent people will be placed in greater
jeopardy and every innocent, lawabiding . . . citizen in this land will have
cause to weep and despair.
Today, why should a policeman go out
and risk his life to catch a known
murderer or criminal who is armed with
a gun, when the Supreme Court will
find some small technicality . . . to find a
way to turn that murderer or criminal
loose and then, [in its decisions], attack
the officer who risked his life and reflect
98
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upon his inteLgtity,by inferring that we
cannot t111st a policeman to do right. . . .
That is their attitude.
Under the Court's logic in the Miranda
case, the day may come when a parent
cannot ask his child about any harm the
child has committed upon his mother
without the parent giving him a warning
that anything the child says may be used
against him. Should fathers and mothers
be required [to gve the Miranda
warnings] before they ask a child about
an act that may be criminal. . . [?I
[TIhe spiraling rate of crime that now
plagues our nation and endangers our
internal security will continue unabated
- even worsen - so long as this rigid
and arbitrary prohibition against the
admission into evidence of voluntary
confessions by criminals is imposed on
the processes of justice. As chosen
representatives of our people we have a
duty to do something about it."
It was not the Constitution that changed.
It was five members of the Court [in
Miranda] who undertook to change the
Constitution. . . .
This is nothing less than an usurpation
by the Court of the power to amend the
Constitution. That power is not reposed
in the Court by the Constitution.
It is that usurpation of power and its
exercise that we are truly trylng to
correct.

I wholeheartedly agree that [changes in
the Constitution should be made by
constitutional amendment]. We are here
protesting and trylng to rectify 5-4 Court
decisions which have had the effect of
amending the Constitution - a power
the Supreme Court does not have under
the Constitution.
Throughout the subcommittee hearings
and the debates on the Senate floor, Senator
Sam Enrin proved to be McClellanS chief
lieutenant. He, too, had drafted some of the
provisions contained in the Judiciary
Committee's Crime Bill. As we have seen, at
first Ervin had balked at attempting to
overturn Miranda by legslation. But then
Enin threw himself into the battle with
considerable gusto:

If you believe that the people of the
United States should be niled by a
judicial oligarchy con~posedof five
Supreme Court justices rather than by
the Constitution of the United States,
you ought to vote against Title 11. If you
believe that self-confessed murderers,
rapists, robbers, arsonists, burglars, and
thieves ought to go unpunished, you
ought to vote against Title 11. . . . Ru. l f
you believe as the senator from North
Carolina believes, that enough has been
done for those who murder and rape
and rob, and that something ought to be
done for those who do not wish to be
murdered or raped or robbed, then you
should vote for Title 11.
When the Supreme Court takes the
words of the Constitution and attribute;
to them a meaning which allorvs selfconfessed murderers and rapists and
arsonists . . . to go free of justice, then I
think it is time for us to do something
because we are the only power on earth
which can do anything to protect
American people against decisions like
this, decisions which constitute a
usurpation of power denied to the
majority of the Supreme Court by the
very instrument they profess to interpret.
All I can say is that the majority of the
Supreme Court, in the Miranda case, . . .
evidently wedded themselves to the
strange theory that no man should be
allowed to confess his guilt, even though
the Bible says, even though psychiatnsts
assert, and even though those interested
in the rehabilitation of prisoners declare
than an honest 'confession is good for
the soul.' Hence, they invented rules in
the Mirnnda case to keep people from
confessing their crimes and sins. The
wisest of men could not have devised
more efficacious rules to accomplish this
object had he pondered the question a
thousand years.
As the Senate debate on the Crime Bill
intensified, Republican Presidential
Candidate kchard M. Nixon issued his
position paper on crime, "Toward Freedoln
from Fear." This paper demonstrated that
when it came to using the Court as a
scapegoat for the crime and violence that
beset the nation, Mr. Nixon yielded neitll~r
to Senate McClellan nor Senator Ervin nor
/
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other uemocrat~cpolitician. Nixon
urSed Congress to pass the bill overturning
~<ioFcdoand Mil-anda and restoring the
~,~~luntariness
test as a way to "redress the
Imbalance"caused by these decisions - a
to offset the blow suffered by "the
peace forces in our society"
Said Nison in "Toward Freedom from
Fcar": "In the last seven years while the
population of this country was rising some
10 percent, crime in the United States rose
n sraglering 88 percent. . . .
"[A] contributing cause of this staggering
increase is that street crime is a more
lucrative and less risky occupation than it
has ever been in the past. Only one of eight
major crimes committed now results in
arrest, prosecution, conviction, and
punishment - and a 12 percent chance of
punishment is not adequate to deter a man
bent on a career in crime. Among the
contributing factors to the small figure are
the decisions of a majority of one of the
U.S. Supreme Court.
[The "only one-in-eight crimes results in
conviction" statistic is especially jolting but highly misleading, as I noted in "How
to Use, Abuse - and Fight Back With Cnme Statistics,"25 Oklahoma h u Review
251-52 (1972). Even if the conviction rate
(the percentage of those held for
prosecution who are found guilty) were 100
percent, only one reported crime in s i .
would result in a conviction, because only
one reported crime in six leads to a criminal
prosecution. The great bulk of reported
crimes never lead to an arrest.]
"The Miranda and Escobedo decisions of
the high court have had the effect of
seriously ham stringng [sic] the peace
forces in our society and strengthening the
criminal forces.
"From the point of view of the peace
forces,the cumulative effect [of] these
decisions has been to very nearly nlle out
the 'confession' as an effective and major
tool in prosecution and law enforcement. . . .
,IT-I!~

"From the point of view of the criminal
forces, the cumulative impact of these
decisions has been to set free patently guilty
individuals on the basis of legal
technicalities.
"The tragc lesson of guilty men walking
free from hundreds of courtrooms across
the country has not been lost on the
criminal community . . .
"The balance must be shifted back
toward the peace forces in our society and a
requisite step is to redress the imbalance
created by these specific decisions. I urould
thus urge Congress to enact proposed
legislation that - dealing with both
Mira?zda and Escobedo -would leave it to
the judge and the jury to determine both
the voluntariness and the validity of any
confession. . . .
"[I] think [the Warren Court's criminal
procedure decisions] point up a genuine
need - a need for future presidents to
include in their appointments to the United
States Supreme Court men who are
thoroughly experienced and versed in the
criminal laws of the land."
Senator Karl Mundt, who asked and
obtained unanimous consent to print
Nixon's position paper in the Cor~gressional
Record, noted that "[m]uch of what the
former Vice President discusses in his
position paper is before us in the form of'
the Crime Bill. So Senator McClellan would
have had his colleagues believe. One close
obsenrer of the Senate debate opined that
"McClellan's most eminent supporter turned
out to be Rchard Nixon."
During the debate on the Senate floor,
Senators Enin and McClellan repeatedly
referred to the transcript of the McClellan
subcommittee hearings for o\renvhelming
evidence of the heavy blow the Warren
Court's confession nllings had dealt law
enforcement and the strong need to right
the situation by overturning the n~lings.
Unfortunately, when it came to openmindedness and fair play senator
McClellan's subcommittee hearings left a
great deal to be desired. As one close
student of Title I1 pointed out, "the familiar
claims of a direct connection between the
enlargement of procedural requirements
and a rising crime rate were repeated by a
parade of districc attorneys, police chiefs,
and other representatives of what might be
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Senate floor, Senators Ervin
and McClellan repeatedly
referred to the transcript of
the McClellan subcommittee
hearings for overwhelming
evidence of the heavy blow the
Warren Court's confession
rulings had dealt law
enforcement and the s
need to right the situation by
overturning the rulings.
Unfortunately, when it came to
open-mindedness and fair
play, Senator McClellanTs
subcommittee hearings left a
great dei
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called the 'law enforcement lobby"' Senator
McClellan himself noted (with evident
pride) that the record of his subcommittee
hearings "contains letters from 122 chiefs of
police in 37 states."
When Senator Joseph Tydings, who led
the opposition to Title I1 in the Senate,
charged that not a single constitutional law
professor or criminal law professor had
been gven an opportunity to testify before
Senator McClellan's subcommittee on the
wisdom or constitutionality of this
proposal, McClellan did not deny it. He
responded simply that every member of the
Senate had been invited to testify and that a
person from Tydings' own state has also
testified (the president of the Maryland
District Attorneys Association).
The conspicuous absence of any law
professors at the subcommittee hearings
(or any defense lawyers or public defenders
for that matter) could hardly be attributed
to a lack of interest by those in academia.
When asked by Senator Tydings to state
their views on the desirability of § 3501
and other anti-Court provisions and on the
power of Congress to enact them, 212 law
professors (including 24 law school deans)
from 43 law schools had responded. Most
attacked the constitutionality of the
anti-Miranda provision; not a single one
defended it.
Almost all of the law enforcement
officials who appeared before the Senate
subcommittee talked about both the need
for and the constitutionality of Title IT, thus
telling McClellan, Enfin, and their allies
what they wanted, and expected, to hear.
But the testimony of the most eminent
witness to appear before the subcommittee,
J. Edward Lumbard, chief judge of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
chairman of the ABA special Committee on
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice,
probably surprised and disappointed
proponents of Title 11.
A year earlier, Judge Lumbard had
voiced his unhappiness with the approach
the Supreme Court had taken in Escobedo.
And during his appearance before the
subcommittee he made it clear he was not
enamored of Miranda. At one point he
agreed that the self-incrimination clause
would seem to have no bearing whatever
on the admissibility of a confession that
100
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satisfied the traditional pre-Miranda
voluntariness test (calling this his "o\m
personal view"). At another point, he agreed
that there is "no better evidence" of a
person's guilt that his own voluntary
confession. Nevertheless, Judge Lumbard
balked at overturning Miranda by
legslation.
He told the subcommittee that if
Congress were unhappy with Mi randa
because it unduly hampered police efforts
to apprehend criminals "the only way to
correct the situation would be by
amendment to the Constitution . . . we
must apply the Constitution and the law as
the Supreme Court has interpreted them."
When asked specifically whether the muchquoted language in Miranda "encourag[ing]
Congress and the States to consider their
laudable search for increasingly effective
ways of protecting the rights of the
individual while promoting efficient
enforcement of our law" "opens the door
for legslation [such as Title TI] which
would pennit our avoiding the
constitutional amendment process," Judge
Lumbard answered, "No; I don't think it
permits you to do that." He added that
Congress could not enact legslation that
failed to do everything the Court said had
to be done "[u]nlessyou can find some
suitable substitute for the requirements laid
down by the Supreme Court."
At this point, Senator McClellan made it
plain that he was only interested in
abolishing Miranda, not in finding a
"suitable substitute" for it. He also left litile
doubt that he was well aware that
abolishing Miranda by legslation would be
a risky venture. Consider the following
exchange:
Senator McClellan: ". . . If they [a
majority of the justices] base the Miranda
decision strictly on constitutional issues, I
don't understand how you could write a
statute that did not do everything the Court
has said must be done. And if you do that,
you destroy everything that you seek to
attain anyhow."
Judge Lumbard: "Unless you can find
some suitable substitute for the
requirements laid down by the Supreme
Court. . . ."
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Senator McClellan: "They [a majority nf
the justices] wouldn't accept it as suitahlc
unless it accomplished the destruction ttlnt
their decision does. They say it is based on
the Constitution. I don't know how you cnn
do it. They say you have got to do these
things. Well, how can you do less if the
Constitution requires that this be donel"
In the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary's report recommending that
Title I1 be enacted into law, the commillec
maintained that "[tlhe Supreme Court ilscif
suggests" that Congress is free to overturn
Miranda by statute and that Congress
should accept this invitation because it "is
better able to cope with the problem of
confessions than is the Court." With one
esception, the committee relied only on law
enforcement officials and several U.S.
senators who had testified before the
subcommittee. The one exception was
Judge Lumbard, even though, as we have
seen, he appeared to have said just the
opposite of what the committee wished to
hear. How did this remarkable turn of
events come about?
The Judiciary Committee report took
Judge Lumbard's testimony out of contest.
The report quotes the judge as follows:
"In my opinion, it is most important the
Congress should take some action in the
important areas I have discussed. The
legslative process permits a wide variety of
views to be screened and testimony can be
taken from those who know the facts and
those who bear the responsibility for law
enforcement.
"The legslative process is far better
calculated to set standards and rules by
statute than is the process of announcins
principles through court decisions in
particular cases where the facts are limited.
The legislative process is better adapted to
seeing the situation in all its aspects and
establishing a system and rules which can
govern a multitude of different cases."
This testimony sounds as if Judge
Lumbard was cheering on the Congress in
its efforts to abolish Miranda by legslation,
but only because the Judiciary Committee
omitted both what the judge had told thc
subcommittee earlier and what he was to
tell it later. Judge Lumbard had pointed out
earlier that the Miranda Court had not dcdt
urlth certain situations, such as what rulci,

:~n):should apply when the police are
q~~c'tinning
someone not in custody, e.g.,
Inr,-r\iewinga person in his own home
\\7111 other family members present. He told
Congress it should "feel free to state a
policy and lay down appropriate rules
rt-R:irdingthe admission of evidence" in
thcic situations. These were "the important
arcas" Judge Lumbard was talking about in
tllc portion of his testimony quoted by the
Judiciary Committee (areas for which the
h,liranda opinion had not provided definite
snswers) when he testified he thought it
uniostimportant that the Congress should
take some action in the important areas I
have discussed."
If there were any doubts about what
Judge Lumbard meant in the testimony
quoted by the Committee Report, he
resolved them later when responding to a
question from Senator Hugh Scott:
"No; I don't think [the language
encouragng the Congress to establish other
procedures which are equally effective in
app"ing suspects of their rights] permits
you tc do that [overturn Miranda without
invoking the constitutional amendment
process], but there certainly is a wide area
which obviously the Court had not covered
in its opinion in the Miranda cases, not only
the matter of questioning before a person is
in custody, but then the manner in which
the defendant or suspect is handled while
he is in custody, the way in which the
wrning is gven, the record that is made,
the presence of other people . . . these are
oh~iouslythe nest questions that are going
to be raised in contested cases.
"I think that this whole area is open to
the Congress and . . . it would be most
helpful and most important that Congress
should attempt to deal with these areas, and
lay down the rules and the standards so far
as federal cases are concerned."
The Judiciary Committee report was
also less than honest in its treatment of the
testimony of another federal judge who
appeared at the subcommittee hearings:

Judge Alexander Holtzoff, a federal district
judge for the District of Columbia. The
committee assured the full Senate that
Judge Holtzoff "sees no constitutional bar to
congressional abrogation of the Mallory
rule," quoting from his testimony. But when
it discussed Congress' freedom to enact
legslation overturning Escobedo and
Miranda, the committee omitted any
reference to Judge Holtzoff's testimony, no
doubt because this time he told the
subcommittee that there was a
constitutional bar to congressional action:
"Of course, the Escobedo and the
Miranda cases are in a different class [than
Malloly] in one important respect. They are
based on the Constitution. They hold that
the Constitution requires these warnings.
Therefore, it would take a constitutional
amendment, unless the Supreme Court
overmles itself, whereas, the h 4 a l l o ~rule
being purely a procedural rule, can be
changed by legslation."
Those asked to testik at the Senate
subcommittee hearings on the Crime Bill
were those whose testimony was espected
to advance the cause of the subcommittee's
chairman, Senator John McClellan. As the
Senate Judiciary Committee Report's
treatment of testimony of Judges Holtzoff
and Lumbard well illustrates, on those rare
occasions when a witness said something
that disappointed Senator h4cClellan,
that testimony was misrepresented
or simply ignored.
The legslative history of 5 3501 makes
it hard to take seriously any argument that
courts should defer to Congress' superior
fact-finding capacity On this occasion at
least, the much vaunted superior factfinding capacity of Congress was little in
evidence. The le@slativehistory of 5 3501
also greatly impairs, if it does not destroy,
other arguments that proponents of the
provision have made - that 5 3501 takes
into account the Miranda warnings or
recognizes the central holding of Mil-anda or
represents a "blend" of the old \roluntariness
test and the new Miranda decision. The last
thing congressional proponents of 5 3501
wanted to do was to pay respect to
Miranda. They were determined to bur)?
Mil-an&, not to recognize it.
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